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The financing of Roman city politics,
1050-1150*
by Chris Wickham
It was common knowledge in medieval western Europe that the papal court,
which was crystallising as the Curia in the period of this article, was corrupt, and
so was Rome in general. The papal judicial system, expanding rapidly from the
1130s, had a particularly bad name. John of Salisbury in the Policraticus, writ-
ten in the 1160s, can speak for very many: in the Roman church, «iustitiam non
tam veritati, quam pretio reddunt»1. And already around 1100, before that
expansion, an unknown (plausibly Spanish) author penned a particularly
goliardic satire, De Albino et Rufino or the Tractatus Garsiae, about the trans-
lation of Sts Silver and Gold by Pope Urban II in 1098-1099. Urban, «avidis-
simus pontifex», translated them to the shrine of St Cupidity, near that of her sis-
ter Avidissima and the church of her mother Avarice. «These are the two mar-
tyrs, who bravely defeated kings, emperors, dukes, tetrarchs, princes and other
powers of the world … these are the precious martyrs, through whom the Roman
pope defeated Guiberto [Clement III, the rival pope], vanquished Henry [IV],
curbed the senate, took over the state (rempublicam),... bravely attacked the
house of Crescenzio [Castel Sant’Angelo], powerfully laid open the Tarpeian
seat, climbed the Capitol, opened the treasury of St Peter...» And in honour of
this, the pope and his fat cardinals ate and drank uncontrollably, in a Terence-
influenced parody of the last supper. In the middle of the Investiture Dispute, a
period of papal history which otherwise seems notably humourless, a writer
could poke fun at the way Urban had indeed, as we shall see, quite probably
taken over Rome in 1097-10982.
*I am grateful to Sandro Carocci for a critique of this text and to Giuliano Milani for a useful dis-
cussion. In this text, I put names of Italians into modern Italian, except for popes, and
Hildebrand before he became Gregory VII, who is less recognisable in English as Ildebrando.
1 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. C.C.I. Webb, 2 vols., Oxford 1909, VI. 24 (II, p. 68).
2 Tractatus Garsiae, ed. R.M. Thomson, Leiden 1973, quotes from pp. 20, 22, cf. 28. A. Becker,
Papst Urban II. (1088-1099), Stuttgart 1964-1988, cites this text but does not analyse it. Note
that the “papal reform” movement (cf. below, note 38) seems to have had one clear effect: Urban
and his cardinals were satirised for gluttony, not sex, unlike in tenth-century sources such as
Liutprand of Cremona: Antapodosis, in Liudprandi Opera, ed. J. Becker, Monumenta
Germaniae historica [henceforth MGH], Scriptores rerum germanicarum [henceforth SRG]
(Hannover, 1915), pp. 1-158, e.g. II. 48.
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I begin with these well-known texts simply to remind the reader how gen-
eralised was this sort of critique; indeed, not only was it “common knowl-
edge” to medieval writers but it is also to modern historians, from
Gregorovius to the present. And, although material of this kind mostly came
from writers who lived a long way from Italy, we would be mistaken to see it
as exclusively consisting of uncomprehending and inaccurate stereotypes;
from the 1120s alone, the enthusiastic recounting in the Historia
Compostellana of Diego Gelmírez’s benedictiones in gold and silver to the
courts of Calixtus II, Honorius II and later Innocent II, or Caffaro di
Caschifellone’s detailed account to the commune of Genoa of what he spent
in 1120 to persuade Calixtus to take archiepiscopal powers over Corsica away
from the church of Pisa, are precise instances of the practice of gift-giving on
a large scale to members of the Curia and its beneficial results3. The Roman
church needed, or thought it needed, as much money or precious metals from
as many people as possible, and was fairly relaxed about the means it used to
get it4. This amassing of money inside the church is relevant to my argument,
and I shall return to it later. But the purpose of this article is not to discuss
the rights and wrongs of papal “corruption”; rather, it is to analyse how
money worked in the framework of Roman urban politics. Outside critics did
not greatly distinguish between the Roman church and the city of Rome, but
they were by no means the same – and certainly not in the first, uneasy, cen-
tury of the international papacy, a period in which no pope until 1130 and few
cardinals were of Roman origin. The Romans took money too; but they took
it for different purposes, above all in return for political support inside the
city. It is this which tells us most about the financing of the Roman political
system in the decades either side of 1100. Giorgio Chittolini has always been
interested in the internal structuring of states, and I hope that this case study
from an earlier period will contribute to the development of the themes he
pioneered.
Chris Wickham
3 Historia Compostellana, ed. E. Falque Rey, Turnhout 1988, II. 4, 10, 16, 20, etc.; Annali ge-
novesi di Caffaro e de’ suoi continuatori, 1, ed. L.T. Belgrano, Roma 1890, pp. 20-21n. (pp. 18-
22 for context). For a recent discussion, see J. Laudage, Rom und das Papsttum im frühen 12.
Jahrhundert, in Europa an der Wende vom 11. zum 12. Jahrhundert, ed. K. Herbers, Stuttgart
2002, pp. 23-53, the best analytical account of the period from Paschal II to Calixtus II, with a
large bibliography of previous work; for the gifts, pp. 49-52 (p. 50: «Korruption ist hier wohl das
richtige Stichwort»); for the most recent narrative account, see M. Stroll, Calixtus II (1119-1124),
Leiden 2004, esp. pp. 241-254, 301-312. Caffaro gave not only to ecclesiastics (2000 silver
marks, mostly to the pope, 353 ounces of gold and £100 in Pavese denarii) but also to lay aris-
tocrats from Rome: 155 marks to the Pierleoni and also jewellery, 100 to Pietro the urban pre-
fect, 40 to Leone Frangipane, and 25 to Stefano Normanno.
4 See, very generally, K. Jordan, Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert,
in «Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken», 25 (1933-1934), pp.
61-104. Calixtus II could be pretty explicit about his position here, according to Landolfo di San
Paolo, who tried in 1120 to win a court case before him without any success: «frater, pecunia est
res, de qua homo potest facere multum bonum. Tu pecunia non habes, nec tempus supersendi
cause tue nunc est…» See Landulphi Iunioris Historia Mediolanensis, ed. C. Castiglioni, Bologna
1934 (Rerum Italicarum scriptores, 2nd ed., V. 2), c. 48 bis.
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Let us begin with some data, so as to build up a picture of the use of
money in urban politics. One particularly clear source is from Rome itself, the
Annales Romani. These annals, for the years 1044-1073, 1100-1121, and 1181-
1187, are a heterogeneous group of separate texts (and the first is itself also
probably not a single text), copied into a miscellany now in the Vatican in no
particular order; but the twelfth-century hands are probably Roman, and the
content is in each case written from a Roman point of view5. The first two sets
give some prominence to money. So in 1046, the exiled pope Benedict IX
«divided the Roman populus», «per praemii cupiditatem», and took back the
papacy; in 1058 Benedict X gained the fidelity of «the majority of the Roman
populus» and the «comites» around the city (here, as elsewhere, the aristoc-
racy of the Campagna Romana), «data pecunia». In 1059 Hildebrand sent
«pecunya [sic]» to Rome to Leone di Benedetto Christiano (the ancestor of
the Pierleoni) to divide the populus against Benedict X; in 1062 Hildebrand
and Leone distributed «pecunia per urbem» all night long («tota nocte illa»
– the implication is “in secret”) to prevent the coronation of Cadalo of Parma
as pope the next day; after a stand-off, once Cadalo ran out of money («pecu-
nia deficiente») his backers the comites left him, so he had to return to
Parma. The antipopes against Paschal II were defeated in similar ways:
Paschal gave pecunia to Giovanni di Oddolina, the main supporter of the
bishop of the Sabina, and the latter’s papal project failed; his successor the
archpriest Maginulfo was more successful, defeating Paschal’s forces in the
Circo Massimo in 1105 with the support of a variety of powerful Romans, but
once again «when Maginulfo’s pecunia ran out, all his coniuratio left him»,
and he had to flee. In 1120, the followers of Gregory VIII were similarly per-
suaded to give in by Pietro Leone, «accepta pecunia», on behalf of Calixtus II,
who also gained the «fidelitas» of «plures equites hac pedites» in the city,
«data pecunia»6.
The papal biographies written by two influential cardinals, Pandolfo in
the 1130s and Bosone up to the 1170s, tell similar stories. Pandolfo’s biogra-
phy of Paschal II relates that Paschal used 1000 unciae of gold sent from
Count Roger of Sicily to get Clement III out of Rome at the end of the latter’s
life in 1099. The pope also in 1116 attempted to gain the support of Tolomeo
of Tuscolo with the castle of Ariccia, and that of Tolomeo’s allies with gold,
silver and jewels. Pandolfo’s detailed and bitter account of the accession of
Honorius II in 1124 depicts the Frangipani and their allies imposing
Honorius against the will of the cardinals, and then, by night («nocte»), buy-
ing off Honorius’s two main lay opponents, Pietro the urban prefect and
Pietro Leone, with, respectively, the castle of Formello “with extra gifts” and
The financing of Roman city politics, 1050-1150
5 Ed. L. Duchesne in Le Liber Pontificalis, II, Paris 1955 [henceforth LP], pp. 331-350. For the
manuscript and the heterogeneity of the text, see D. Whitton, The Annales Romani and Codex
Vaticanus Latinus 1984, in «Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e archivio
muratoriano», 84 (1972-1973), pp. 125-143.
6 LP, pp. 332, 334, 336-337, 345-347.
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the city of Terracina (though this was later taken back). Honorius had the
opposition of the cardinals for two days but did not resign, «recordans …
Romanorum profundam avaritiam», and the «cardinales venditi» backed
down7. In later decades, Bosone uses the image of money in much the same
way, and moralises about it more generally. Anacletus II in 1130, «relying on
his multitude of wealth», attacked Innocent II in the houses of the
Frangipani, but failed; so he despoiled the treasuries of San Pietro in
Vaticano and Santa Maria Maggiore, and with this «sought to buy the major-
ity of the venal city, corrupting the maiores and oppressing the minores»,
with nearly complete success. Alexander III’s opponent Victor IV in 1161 sub-
orned some senators (we are now in the period of the formalised Roman
Senate) with pecunia to get them to imprison Alexander in Trastevere,
though this time the procedure failed. In 1165, during the wars with Frederick
Barbarossa, Alexander appointed a new papal vicar in Rome, to whom the
majority of the Roman populus swore the “customary fidelity” for “not a
small amount of money”. In 1166, Barbarossa, since he could not subdue
Rome by arms, chose «pecuniarum largitio» instead, and, «since Rome, if it
finds a buyer, offers itself venally», many in the city happily fell for this, until
Alexander countered it with the money of the church. The following year,
during the German siege of Rome, the king of Sicily managed to get «pecunia
multa» into the city for Alexander, who used part of it to bind the Pierleoni
and Frangipani «more tightly» to him, so that they would organise the
defence of the city; he used the rest to pay for the defence of the city gates,
before Rome was saved by the plague that destroyed Barbarossa’s army8.
These three texts are not always to be taken literally, of course; but they
certainly represent a forceful, and century-long, way of expressing the rules
for obtaining loyalty from Roman political players. And they are backed up by
many more sources, from outside the city, who may be expressing the
European “common knowledge” about Rome, but all the same write about it
in very similar ways. Let us follow them chronologically, again from 1050,
restricting ourselves to contemporaries or near-contemporaries. Pietro
Damiani, an eye-witness, accused both Benedict X in 1058 and Cadalo of
Parma in 1062 of paying pecunia to the Roman populus in return for support.
In 1059, according to the slightly later and ferociously anti-Gregorian
Benzone of Alba, Hildebrand “corrupted” the Romans with «multa peccunia»
Chris Wickham
7 LP, pp. 297, 303; Liber pontificalis prout exstat in codice manuscripto Dertusensi, ed. J.-M.
March, Barcelona 1925, pp. 203-206, also re-edited in Liber pontificalis nella recensione di Pietro
Guglielmo OSB e del card. Pandolfo, ed. U. Přerovský, 3 vols., Roma 1978 (Studia gratiana 21-23),
at II, pp. 750-754. The latter editions of Pandolfo, based on an older and slightly fuller manuscript
from Tortosa, supersede Duchesne’s for all the popes after 1099, but I only cite them for Honorius,
for their textual changes are only significant for that pope, and the books are hard to find. Note
that March, pp. 41-60, does not consider Pandolfo to be the author of the Paschal life; the argu-
ment for Pandolfo seems more plausible to Přerovský, I, pp. 111 ff., and to me.
8 LP, pp. 380, 398, 412, 414, 416-417. Money for the “customary fidelity” was, however, by now
an established tradition: see below, text to note 37.
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in order to get Nicholas II crowned (this matches the more neutral view of the
Annales Romani), and did the same to get himself elected pope in 1075. For
the equally ferocious Gregorian Bonizone of Sutri, Cadalo of Parma in 1062
with gold and silver again won over many Romans, «avari et cupidi», this
time including aristocrats, capitanei, though he was foiled by the «magnifica
dona» given against him by Goffredo of Tuscany; a year later, in his second
period in Rome, by now restricted to Castel Sant’Angelo, he paid his main
supporter Cencio di Stefano 300 pounds of silver to get away. Another pro-
Gregorian commentator, Berthold, says that Henry sent gold and silver to
Rome in 1080 to “corrupt” the Romans to his side; yet another, Bernold, tells
us that Henry was accepted in Rome in 1083 «partly induced by precium,
partly seduced by many promises», and that a year later the Byzantine
emperor sent «maxima pecunia» to Henry to fight the Normans, but the lat-
ter spent it instead «ad conciliandum sibi vulgus Romanorum», so that he
could enter the city to be crowned emperor. In the same period, according to
Donizone the biographer of Matilde of Canossa, Matilde sent Gregory VII
200 pounds of silver (or alternatively 700 pounds of silver and 94 of gold) to
help him combat Guiberto/Clement III9.
The French abbot Geoffroy of Vendôme was himself an actor in 1094,
when Urban II was temporarily in Rome and restricted to the fortified
Frangipani quarter near the Colosseum. While Geoffroy was there, Ferruccio,
keeper of the Lateran palace for Clement III, offered it to Urban for money,
which Urban and his cardinals could not afford; Geoffroy did have it, howev-
er, according to a letter of his written twenty years later, which claims he
spent 13,000 solidi on the deal between gold, silver, money, mules and hors-
es. Later, in 1099, following Donizone again, Clement III as one of his final
acts «began to seduce the Roman citizens with precium» against Paschal II10.
Paschal himself in a letter of 1105 says that some Romans supported
Maginulfo against him because they did not have access to munera from his
curia. A letter from a later papal schism, in 1119-20, from the archbishop of
Trier to Henry V, described the thesaurum et pecuniam which he distributed
to Henry’s Roman clientes in favour of the imperial pope, Gregory VIII. In
1130, according to Falcone of Benevento, Anacletus II’s brother Leone
Pierleoni gained the support of ‘nearly all’ the Roman populus by opening the
The financing of Roman city politics, 1050-1150
9 Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani, II, ed. K. Reindel, MGH, Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit, IV.2,
München 1988, nn. 58, 89 (p. 533); Benzo Albensis, Ad Heinricum imperatorem libri VII, ed.
H. Seyffert, MGH, SRG, LXV, Hannover 1996, VII.2 (pp. 596, 602); Bonizo episcopus Sutrinus,
Liber ad amicum, ed. E. Dümmler, in MGH, Libelli de lite, I, Hannover 1891, pp. 571-620, VI (p.
595); Die Chroniken Bertholds von Reichenau und Bernolds von Konstanz, 1054-1100, ed. I.S.
Robinson, in MGH, SRG, NS XIV, Hannover 2003, pp. 380, 431, 439; Donizo, Vita Matildis, ed.
L. Bethmann, MGH, Scriptores [henceforth SS], XII, Hannover 1856, pp. 348-409, II, lines 300-
303 (a contemporary manuscript gloss, ed. p. 385n, has the alternative figure – it was metal from
the Canossa church treasury, melted down).
10 Geoffroy de Vendôme, Œuvres, ed. G. Giordanengo, Turnhout 1996, pp. 288-290; Donizo,
Vita Matildis cit., II, lines 886-887.
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treasury, in an account which matches that of Bosone. In 1149, we return to
John of Salisbury, who narrates that Eugenius III was honorably received by
the Roman magnates, who «smelt the gold and silver of Gaul»11.
This list is certainly not complete; there are so many chronicles, large and
small, for this troubled period, when Rome was more than usually the focus
of historians’ attention all over the West. But the collection of references set
out here are fairly homogeneous, and some of their common features deserve
to be developed. The first point is that nearly all of them concern only money
or treasure. It is very notable how seldom any pope rewards a Roman sup-
porter with land in these texts; only Pandolfo’s references to Ariccia,
Formello and Terracina stand out here. The second is that these rewards are
above all for political support at times of papal schism or disputed election.
This may not be that significant, since a rival pope was normally the focus of
political dissidence in the city in this period. What is significant, on the other
hand, as a third point, is that such cessions are almost always directed to the
laity, rather than to the clergy, and after papal elections, not during them.
Charges of simony are actually rather rare in these sources (Pandolfo leans
over backwards not to say it for the actual election of Honorius II, although
the Historia Compostellana says it for Anacletus II, Benzone of Alba says it
with some verve for Gregory VII, and if one went back to Gregory VI one
would find it without difficulty12). It is essentially the Romans who can be
“bought” in these narratives. That is to say, it is the stability of the position of
popes in the city, rather than their actual holding of office, which is at stake
– even though it is clear that popes whose Roman support has vanished have
lost a lot, and several have to give up papal claims.
Less consistent is the status of these rewards. Words like donum are
found in the sources, a gift in return for loyalty, but also pretium, indicating
that the Romans have been literally, and much less honourably, bought.
Given that our sources are hardly neutral pieces of sociology, one could rea-
sonably conclude that the greater or lesser honour of such transfers of wealth
depended on the political standpoint of the chronicler. (It should be noted
that the word “bribe” does not exist in the Latin of this period; a donum or
munus may be represented by writers as honourable or dishonourable/cor-
rupt, more or less a “bribe” in our terms, but the word remains the same; only
Chris Wickham
11 Udalrici codex, ed. P. Jaffé in Rerum germanicarum, V, Monumenta Bambergensia, Berlin
1869, pp. 1-469, n. 124 (pp. 235-236); Pontificorum Romanorum vitae, ed. J.M. Watterich, 2
vols., Leipzig 1862, II, p. 110; Falco Beneventanus, Chronicon, in Patrologiae cursus completus,
series latina, ed. J.P. Migne [henceforth PL], CLXXIII, Paris 1854, cols. 1149-1262, at col. 1203;
for 1130 see also Historia Compostellana cit., III. 23, which hints at simony too; John of
Salisbury, Historia pontificalis, ed. M. Chibnall, Edinburgh 1956, c. 21.
12 For Gregory VI, see the texts assembled and criticised in G.B. Borino, L’elezione e la deposizione
di Gregorio VI, in «Archivio della Società romana di storia patria» [henceforth «ASRSP»], 39
(1916), pp. 141-252, 295-410, at pp. 208-222. For earlier popes, see for example Rodolfo il Glabro,
Cronache dell’anno Mille, ed. G. Cavallo and G. Orlandi, Milano 1989, IV.4, 17 for accusations of
simony against John XIX and Benedict IX, neither of whom are very likely to have had to pay
much for their effectively hereditary succession; the moral panic was beginning then.
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the giving of a pretium, a much more charged word, can really be assimilat-
ed to what we would call bribery without question13). What does, all the same,
seem clear is that it was standard in the political practice of Rome in the cen-
tury under discussion to reward political affiliation with money and precious
metals. Otherwise put, Roman political actors expected to be paid, at least by
1050, and there are indications in our scarcer sources that this practice was
at least a century old then too14.
This is important; for it was not at all common in the Europe of the peri-
od under discussion here. By the twelfth century, it is true, rulers all across
Europe had come to see that warfare could not be waged without money, in
large part at least. So, for example, when John of Salisbury, in his own
account at least, represented himself as setting out a passionate denunciation
of pretia and munera, including the quote I began with, and the dishonest
and avaricious practices of many (though not all) of the leaders of the Roman
church – and also improper gifts to the Romans – he was actually talking to
his friend Pope Hadrian IV. The pope laughed, thanked him for his open-
ness, and in reply told a parable of the parts of the body who were disgusted
at the greed of the stomach, and went on strike so that it would not be fed; as
a result, the whole body became weak. Look at it in the round, said Hadrian
(according to John): if you don’t accumulate tributa, you can’t pay an army,
«quia nemo potest sine stipendiis militare»15. Some of our most important
European political actors – like Henry IV, paid by the Byzantine emperor, or
the Normans, paid by many – acted as mercenaries on occasion. But even in
England (whence Hadrian came, and where John was writing), where the
early monetisation of warfare is particularly well-attested, normal political
loyalty was still expressed in terms of the service due in return for cessions of
land and political rights16. This was the standard currency of high politics
everywhere in our period; this is what a political actor expected for his serv-
ice. Not in Rome. It is scarcely surprising that there should often be a tone of
hostility in our sources, for loyalty given so easily, and apparently often so
flightily, for money. This was the age of the major moral panic over simony,
after all, which was only one expression of a clear unease, indeed fear, in a
The financing of Roman city politics, 1050-1150
13 See most recently The languages of gift in the early middle ages, ed. W. Davies and P.
Fouracre, Cambridge 2010, esp. the conclusion.
14 In Liutprand of Cremona, Historia Ottonis, in Liudprandi Opera cit., pp. 159-175, c. 17, John
XII, «non ignorans quam facile Romanorum mentes pecunia posset corrumpere», promises
money to the Romans if they will attack Otto I in 964; in Chronica pontificum et imperatorum
S. Bartholomaei in Insula Romani, in MGH, Scriptores, XXXI, ed. O. Holder-Egger, Hannover
1903, pp. 189-223, at p. 214, a thirteenth-century addition to the text but plausibly using earli-
er material, Boniface VII, «sparsa per urbem peccunia», takes back the papacy in 984 from
John XIV. Other early references focus on the more conventional sin of selling justice (see e.g.
below, note 28).
15 Policraticus, ed. Webb cit., VI.24 (Webb, II, p. 72 for the quote). VI.25 ff. is John’s reply with
esprit d’escalier.
16 J. Prestwich, War and finance in the Anglo-Norman state, in «Transactions of the Royal histori-
cal society», 5 ser., 4 (1954), pp. 19-43; S. Reynolds, Fiefs and vassals, Oxford 1994, pp. 342-373.
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more commercial world, that everything in politics could be bought17.
Rewarding people with land was normal and honourable; rewarding with
money was dangerous and potentially polluting. Romans seemed not to care
about this danger, and writers elsewhere condemned them for it. But for us
as analysts, condemnation is (or should be) beside the point; what matters is
to understand why the Romans dealt like this. The issue is not one of moral-
ity, but political economy. Why did the economy and society of Rome in our
period favour a political practice based on money?
To answer this question, we have to look at it from two separate direc-
tions. First, and most important, the resources of the popes, who were sel-
dom challenged as the formal rulers of the city of Rome in the period 1012-
1143/44; and second, the interests of the Roman aristocracy itself, and more
generally the urban middling élite which is what is mostly meant by the word
populus18. The popes were not poor. It is true that some sources claim they
were; the Vita Leonis IX papae, for example, says that there were no papal
revenues when the pope took over in the city in 104919; but the monetary deal-
ings listed above by themselves prove otherwise. All the same, it does seem
that they did not in this period have access to lands in quite the way that other
leading political powers did in our period in western Europe. The pope was
the dominante in Lazio, certainly, but his direct political control in most of
the region was much less complete. The outlying territories to the north-west,
north and south-east were by 1050 largely in the hands of autonomous aris-
tocrats, the people whom the Annales Romani generically call comites, as a
result of the patrimonialisation of office-holding and the localisation of polit-
ical/judicial power into castle-based signorial territories, which was a com-
mon trend in eleventh-century Europe. The chaos of papal rivalry in the cen-
tury after 1050 was not a favourable basis for the reversal of these processes.
Only in the mid-twelfth century did popes, notably Eugenius III and Hadrian
IV, begin to rebuild their proprietorial and political rights in parts of Lazio,
castle by castle, often for payments in money; and it was only with Innocent
III at the end of the century that the papacy re-established its control over
most of Lazio as a public power20. In our period, therefore, the standard
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17 See C. Violante, I laici nel movimento patarino, in I laici nella «societas cristiana» dei secoli
XI e XII, Milano 1968, pp. 587-687; L.K. Little, Religious poverty and the profit economy in
medieval Europe, London 1978, esp. pp. 8-41; R.I. Moore, Family, community and cult on the
eve of the Gregorian reform, in «Transactions of the Royal historical society», 5 ser., 30 (1980),
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European political currency of cessions of castles and rural office-
holding/judicial powers was not so readily available to popes. They probably
always maintained as many lands and castles as any other major Italian bish-
op, but the stakes were higher in Rome, particularly once it became the focus
of international interest. It took an alliance of most of the northern Italian
cities twenty years to defeat Barbarossa, after all; so, when popes had to con-
front German armies on their own, they needed more resources than their
surviving network of castra specialia could command.
Around Rome itself, in a wide zone stretching 20-25 kilometres from the
city walls, in all some 1500 square kilometres in size, and also inside the city,
the pope did keep large amounts of land, and here there were also few or no
castles to break up the political hegemony of the city and its rulers. This large
sub-region, the agro romano, was in fact almost wholly owned by the church-
es of Rome, with almost no lay landowning at all21. The pope did not by any
means control all of these churches directly, but they certainly had a hegemo-
ny at least over San Giovanni in Laterano and San Pietro in Vaticano and their
dependencies (San Pietro’s lands were very extensive; San Giovanni’s less so),
and the papacy as an institution also seems plausibly to have owned most of
the sector of land east of the Porta San Giovanni – as far as can be seen in the
absence of the papal archive from this period22. But, outside the city and the
belt of vineyards around it, these lands were mostly leased out in large blocks
on long-term leases, to aristocrats and other important urban families. This
does not mean that the church lost ultimate control of them, and it also kept
at least part of the surplus which could be taken from them; they were secure
bases for the wealth of the Roman churches as a group and the pope in partic-
ular23. But they were not lands that could easily be alienated for the immediate
needs of a political crisis, as was the characteristic situation at times of papal
schism. In the long run, Roman churches did redirect their leasing policies for
political reasons, for example to rising urban families such as the Frangipani,
but this was not much use if one needed to confront (say) the short-term dan-
ger posed by Cadalo of Parma in 1062 and 1063.
The movable resources of the papacy were, by contrast, extremely varied.
One was, without doubt, the rents and other dues which came from the lands
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21 C. Wickham, Iuris cui existens, in «ASRSP», 131 (2008), pp. 5-38; C. Wickham, La struttura
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22 For Vatican properties, see above all L. Schiaparelli, Le carte antiche dell’Archivio Capitolare
di S. Pietro in Vaticano, in «ASRSP», 24 (1901), pp. 393-496, 25 (1902), pp. 273-354 [henceforth
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inédit des revenus fonciers de la basilique du Latran au XIIe siècle, in «Mélanges d’archéologie
et d’histoire», 42 (1925), pp. 117-124; see Wickham, La struttura della proprietà cit., text to n.
81, for papal lands.
23 M. Lenzi, La terra e il potere, Roma 2000, pp. 48-66, 119-136. Rents were generally low, but
made up for by the twelfth century by often substantial entrature or entry-fines; I will argue else-
where that these probably always existed, hidden by the stability of the formulae of emphiteusis
in earlier centuries.
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just mentioned. Rents and entry-fines from aristocrats were in money; rents
from cultivators, when land was exploited directly by the church, were in kind,
but grain and other produce could easily be turned into money by selling them
in the city markets, given that Rome was one of the largest cities in Europe.
Rome was also a major commercial and artisanal centre, and the church took
its cut from this through urban ground rents and again entry-fines, as well as
money from the sales of leases by their holders; and the pope, in particular,
benefited from customs dues at the city gates and the Tiber ports24.
Rome was furthermore, of course, a major focus for pilgrimage. Pilgrims
brought so much money with them that Rome did not have to mint its own
coins from the 980s to the 1180s, but never ever seems to have run short of
cash for large-scale transactions25. The pilgrim economy deserves a focussed
study, but it is at least clear that it was overwhelmingly centred in the Civitas
Leoniana, the future Borgo between San Pietro and Castel Sant’Angelo,
which sees a concentration of shops in our documentary sources for the peri-
od; this highly lucrative area was essentially owned by San Pietro and its
dependencies, even if other churches tried to get sections of it when they
could26. Pilgrims paid rent and bought food and drink; they often died in the
Borgo, and San Pietro had the rights to the goods of the intestate; they also
left very substantial donations on the altars of San Pietro, which Leo IX and
Gregory VII made sure to take over from the “semi-lay” mansionarii who had
controlled them hitherto27. It is still possible to find books which claim that
Rome was only prosperous because of the papal court and the pilgrim trade;
this claim cannot be sustained. But the economy of the city must have been
very substantially affected by the latter. Both the food marketing and the arti-
sanal production of the city would have been influenced, and indeed reorien-
tated, by this constant demand, as any tourist city, however otherwise eco-
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siècle à la fin du XIIIe siècle, Roma 1990, pp. 97-104; for the early period see also L.M.
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Jahrhundert, in «Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte», 7 (1909), pp. 142-
158, at pp. 148, 154.
25 Toubert, Les structures cit., pp. 575-584, based on the documentary evidence. Rome’s excava-
tions all the same show that less money was lost in this period than before the early eighth cen-
tury or after c. 1200, implying that it was less widely used in daily life: see A. Rovelli, Monetary
circulation in Byzantine and Carolingian Rome, in Early medieval Rome and the Christian
West, ed. J.M.H. Smith, Leiden 2000, pp. 85-99, for a crisp summary. It is likely that much of
the pecunia distributed about the city was not in the form of coins.
26 See e.g. SPV, nn. 12, 13, 16, 35, 42; Ecclesiae S. Maria in Via Lata tabularium, ed. L.M.
Hartmann and (for vol. 3) M. Merores, 3 vols., Wien 1895-1913, nn. 36, 152.
27 SPV, nn. 16, 19 for intestacy and donations; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, Il clero di Roma nel
medioevo, Roma 2002, pp. 144-147 for the mansionarii.
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nomically active, is today. And San Pietro, papally controlled, took a large
share of the profit to be made from it.
To these local resources we have to add the international sources of
money available to the popes. These have been better studied, from Karl
Jordan onwards. The papacy had long-standing rights to annual gifts from
the kings of England, to which were added the kings of Sicily in the early
twelfth century, and Iberian rulers as well. They had annual renders from
monasteries, not so much in most cases, but across Europe such sums
mounted up. They had always taken money for the conferring of pallia, when
this took place in Rome (as with the archbishops of Canterbury). They had
also always taken money for papal privileges, and this practice developed
substantially after 1100, as the cases of Caffaro and Diego Gelmírez both
show; the same is true for papal justice, about which outsiders complained
with regularity, and with ever greater insistence when this justice expanded
so dramatically after the 1130s28. These last two are, as we have seen, often
seen as signs of the venality of particular popes; one can make that moral call
if one wants, of course. The cost of papal justice, thanks to the munera nec-
essary to make it work, indeed far outweighed that of judicial recourses else-
where in Europe in the twelfth century – which did not, nonetheless, at all
diminish the desire of litigants to use it29. But the point is that these incom-
ings were part of an established and long-lasting system, which hard-line
critics (who included most of the writers of our narratives) wished to criticise,
but which pragmatic popes like Calixtus II and Hadrian IV were happy to
defend. They were a standard and stable, probably accountable, part of the
papal Finanzverwaltung.
Finally, we must include the very substantial one-off gifts of money or
treasure by political players in the different papal crises of our period.
Beatrice and Matilde of Canossa paid for several of the papal financial inter-
ventions of the eleventh century listed earlier; the counts and then kings of
Sicily paid for several in the twelfth30. The kings of Sicily were particularly rich
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28 For all this see Jordan, Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte cit.; D. Whitton, Papal policy in
Rome, 1012-1124, D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1979, pp. 294-308; for later in the centu-
ry, V. Pfaff, Aufgaben und Probleme der päpstlichen Finanzverwaltung am Ende des 12.
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recourse to credit under Alexander III, see also F. Schneider, Zur älteren päpstlichen
Finanzgeschichte, in «Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken»,
9 (1906), pp. 1-37, at pp. 1-14. Paying for papal justice in an earlier period: e.g. the Acta concilii
Causeiensis of 995, ed. G.H. Pertz, in MGH, SS, III, Hannover 1839, pp. 691-693, at p. 691, on a
failed judicial hearing because of munuscula unwisely not given to Crescentius II; paying for
privileges: e.g., The life of bishopWilfrid by Eddius Stephanus, ed. B. Colgrave, Cambridge 1927,
c. 34. But these are examples chosen at random out of many.
29 C. Wickham, Courts and conflict in twelfth-century Tuscany, Oxford 2003, e.g. p. 276.
30 D. Zema, The houses of Tuscany and of Pierleone in the crisis of Rome in the eleventh centu-
ry, in «Traditio», 2 (1944), pp. 155-175, rather starry-eyed.
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benefactors; and they had lay Romans on their payroll too, as is shown, in
particular, by the survival of a formal document in which King Roger II in
1134 agreed a yearly payment to the Pierleoni of 240 unciae of gold – a
notable sum, worth each year about 20% more than the one-off payment
made to the same family by Caffaro fourteen years before31. Against the popes
and lay factions supported by these parties, the German king/emperors paid
the factions supporting their favoured popes in return. We cannot tell if these
gifts made up for the war damage carried out by the same powers, but, how-
ever partial a recompense, it was certainly a monetisation of such losses.
The papacy was therefore cash-rich (and treasure-rich), and relatively
short of land and other political rights to give to its clients. This made it high-
ly atypical among major European powers, all of which had firm landed
bases, and, however rich in gold and silver they were as well (as, evidently,
were the kings of Sicily), essentially gained all that wealth from the control of
land, which they could also dispose of for political purposes, and regularly
did. It also was atypical of Italian bishops, even of major commercial cities,
all of whom based their power – much smaller-scale than that of the popes –
on their networks of castles and estates. City communes in north-central
Italy, for their part, did have access to some of the resources the pope con-
trolled in Rome, but the pilgrim and international incomings of the pope put
it into a different league here too. Only Venice maintained a major commer-
cial and political operation with almost no land base at all; but even Venice
did not match the papacy in the scale of the resources routinely available to
it which were not based on the control of land, and other powers did not
remotely do so. This made papal power different, even without counting in
the religious issues which structure the narratives of the period; different,
and, to the eyes of writers and political players from more “normal” polities,
disturbing. This difference in papal resources was only reinforced by the fact
that outside powers, emperors or marquises of Tuscany or Normans, when
they intervened politically in Rome, had to do it with money, as they had no
land there to give.
Turning more briefly to the Roman aristocracy: this was a period in which
the major political players in the city were from relatively new families. The
Tuscolani popes of the period 1012-46 had presided over a period in which
the old leading families of consules et duces of the tenth century – such as the
de Melioso, and the various families whom we call the Crescenzi – had, more
and more, left the papal court and begun to focus on the castle-based lord-
ships which were crystallising at the same time: in part because they were
becoming available, but largely precisely because the Tuscolani now domi-
nated the papal power-structure so completely. So would the Tuscolani them-
selves when they lost power in Rome32. By contrast, the élite families which
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31 P.F. Kehr, Diploma purpureo di re Roggero II per la casa Pierleoni, in «ASRSP», 24 (1901),
pp. 253-259; Caffaro, as above, n. 3, supplies the exchange rates for marks and unciae.
32 See in general Toubert, Les structures cit., pp. 974-1000, 1015-1038. For the early history of
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are newly visible in the city by 1050 – the Frangipani (the longest-attested),
the Pierleoni, the Corsi, the Tignosi, the Bracciuti, the Normanni, the
Sant’Eustachio, the family of Cencio di Stefano – did not yet have substantial
lands outside the Agro romano, and did not obtain them before the end of
the century. By the mid-twelfth century, the families which had survived all
had castles and wider lands, it is true. The Pierleoni in Isola Farnese, just out-
side the boundary of the agro romano, some time before 1107, seem to be the
earliest attested, although the heirs of Cencio di Stefano appear in Tuscia
Romana soon after, and the Frangipani would later follow them with greater
enthusiasm in Marittima – though the first known papal cessions of castles
to these families only begin with Honorius II’s gifts of Formello and
Terracina in 112433. Even then, they all continued to deal above all in a city-
based politics, and they continued to do so until well after our period ends. It
is important to stress that these newer families were above all landed; urban
and suburban possessions were was the basis of their wealth, as they were for
any other urban élite of the period. The importance of gifts of money for them
would have been as an important extra, a way of gaining and showing wealth
and power – and paying for retainers – and potentially changeable as politi-
cal status changed, rather than as a stable basis for social position on its own.
Perhaps they would have often been satisfied with further lucrative leases of
urban property; we do not have the right documentation to tell, and our nar-
ratives would not give it much stress; but, in a city with an active money econ-
omy, money would do very well as an alternative. And if this was all true for
the city’s leaders, it was still more true for the wider populus.
It is also necessary to underline just how much richer the papal court was
than any of the newer Roman families. It attracted them, so much so indeed
that they sometimes sought to dominate it directly, most famously in the
sharp Pierleoni-Frangipani oppositions and disputed papal elections of the
period 1118-1138. After the end of that phase of schism, when put on the
defensive by Innocent II’s triumphal return, the Romanorum nobiliores were
keen to attend the papal tribunal, the consistorium, in their silks in 1141, as
Abbot Hariulf of Oudenburg put it in his account of his time there; and we see
much the same in San Gregorio in Celio’s account of its failed attempt to get
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the Crescenzi, O. Gerstenberg, Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Adels im Ausgang des 10.
Jahrhunderts, in «Historische Vierteljahrschrift», 31 (1937), pp. 1-26, and Whitton, Papal poli-
cy in Rome cit., pp. 103-183, are both better than G. Bossi, I Crescenzi, in «Dissertazioni della
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back the castle of Poli in a series of papal hearings in exactly the same peri-
od, 1140-114134. Families of this kind wished to play by papal rules, whenever
they were allowed to, and papal rules in this period involved money as the
main reward for loyalty and dependence. We can see this at moments of
political stability, with the Pierleoni and Frangipani in 1120 taking a cut of
Caffaro’s Genoese money; and we can see it, very evidently, at moments of
crisis in our narratives, when rival papal patrons competed with cash.
I would argue, in fact, that the cash-based wealth of the papal court was the
most important factor in the economic underpinning of the politics of the city
in the period 1050-1150, the city- and money-focus of the urban élite families
being less determinant. For one, the older families too, now called comites in
Roman sources, were still, despite their castle-holding and land-based politics
outside the agro romano, entirely happy to accept the monetary rewards offered
by papal contenders, in just the same way as the urban élite; indeed, the
Tuscolani would never have preferred to rule Tuscolo rather than to have had
proper access to papal resources. Furthermore, looking later, once Innocent III
had recreated a Lazio-wide political system, the leading city families of the early
thirteenth century (most of them newer still than those discussed here) took as
much advantage as they could of the new regional lordships that their papal or
cardinal relatives could offer them, and did so without leaving their firm bases
in the city35. Aristocrats always adapt quickly to the rules of the political game
they find themselves in, so as to get the best advantage out of it. But there was
at least no serious dissonance in our period, despite its air of generalised crisis,
between what the popes could give and the economic horizons of the people in
the city whom the popes needed most to reward.
Money also had a symbolic and religious role in Rome, in a context which
seems not to have had any negative implications: the handing out of money
was prominent in several of the main ceremonial moments of the city of
Rome. The different (but related) ordines written down between the 1140s
and 1190s by Benedetto, Albino and Cencio, which describe the ritual life of
the city in great detail, lay down the payments to be made to participants on
numerous occasions. Often, these are simply payments to cardinals, priests
and singers for their participation in the rituals (and often with money from
the altar of San Pietro, which as we have seen was a secure source of rev-
enues)36; but on major occasions the laity were involved too. In particular, at
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papal elections, and every Christmas and Easter, a series of payments were
made to all the orders of clergy, and also the urban prefect, the palatine
judges, scriniarii and other officials, including, later, the city’s senators. The
makers of the very numerous temporary arches put up on Easter Monday
along the Via Sacra from the Vatican to the Lateran, essentially members of
the laity, were rewarded annually with sums varying between a few denarii
and 45 solidi (and, for the rione of Parione, £6); so were a wide variety of sco-
lae of artisans at Christmas and Easter. At papal elections the pope twice was
required to throw money into the crowd, for different liturgical reasons; so
did several papal officials at different points in the procession through the
arches every Easter Monday; by the late twelfth century the populus also took
“customary gifts” for their swearing of fidelity to incoming popes. And in the
laudes Cornomannie held on the Saturday after Easter, a carnivalesque occa-
sion involving all the population of Rome assembled around the archpriests
of each diaconia of the city in the campus in front of the Lateran palace, one
of the events involved each archpriest sitting backwards on a donkey trying
to stretch back and grab a bowl with 20 solidi in it – until Gregory VII can-
celled the laudes «after the expense of the war grew». These practices plau-
sibly had imperial (Roman or Byzantine) roots in many cases37. The imagery
of the ready availability of papal money can only have been reinforced by
such events; the city’s inhabitants watched the handing over of large sums,
and sometimes had access to them themselves. By the mid-twelfth century, in
particular, the senators and populus also took substantial ‘customary gifts’
for their swearing of fidelity to incoming popes; it is hard to know how much
this was part of any ceremonial, but it must have been linked somehow to the
ritual sequences just described.
Finally, Rome was atypical in that it was, so to speak, a non-hereditary
monarchy, while at the same time being a single city state. With the single
exception of Venice, no other polities with long-term non-hereditary rulers
existed in Europe. The papal monarchy over Rome was hugely profitable, but
any senior cleric could become pope and thus control the profits for an indef-
inite period; papal elections were thus potential, and usually actual, scenes of
intense contestation, including the use of every financial weapon available to
rival popes. (This continued until the firmer bureaucratisation of the election
procedure later in the twelfth century; the schism of 1159 was already a slight-
ly better-behaved process). The fact that these rivals were almost never
Romans, except in the disputed election of 1130, made no difference, for for-
eign popes were no less dependent on political support in the city.
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Contrast city communes in Italy: they had a very different political practice,
based on the opposition of factions, more or (usually) less successfully mediat-
ed through annually-changing collective rule or annual foreign podestà. Ideally,
if a faction was defeated in any one year it could simply wait for the next. Even
without that annual rhythm (which anyway often broke down into violence),
the impulse of factional and family rivalry, with all its overtones of militarism
and aristocratic honour, was quite sufficient as a motive in our communal nar-
ratives38; twelfth-century city chronicles in the rest of Italy rarely put much
weight on buying political support with money, however commercial the city.
And, indeed, factional rivalry was often a sufficient explanation in Rome too,
when there were no papal schisms, especially in the 1110s and 1120s – Pandolfo
never says money had anything to do with the fight over the urban prefecture
in 1116 or the kidnapping of Gelasius II in 111839.
This stress on faction rather than money became stronger, even in Rome, in
the half-century after my period ends. It is significant that the Senate of 1144
onwards, the Roman city commune, was not associated in its formal dealings
with narratives of buying support; and the popes were also largely absent from
the city in the 1160s to 1180s. These narratives do continue, and sometimes
involve individual senators, but they exist above all for papal reasons: because
the papacy and its entourage, when it was in the city, was a rival to the Senate,
still claiming monarchical powers, whether it could put them into practice or
not; because there were still rival claimants to the papacy, until Italian politics
quietened down in the 1180s; and because who was pope continued to have such
enormous financial implications. But the way money was used after this period
also changed. Gifts for papal justice and support certainly continued, and were
indeed quasi-institutionalised. But as far as the Romans themselves were con-
cerned, families more often got annual pensions from outside powers than sin-
gle payments, in a generalisation of the Sicilian payments to the Pierleoni in the
1130s, which meant that political alliances were much more stable; and the actu-
al beneficiaries of such monetary gifts were more often cardinals from leading
families than their secular relatives. The rules of politics had shifted decisively by
1200, and the patterns outlined here were by then less relevant40.
The papacy in our period was the major power in Europe whose wealth
least depended on the direct control of territory and landed property, and was
therefore most liquid, most based on money and treasure. The secular politi-
cal actors in the city in our period were for the most part firmly based in the
city, and ambitions to be territorial powers, and in political terms to deal less
in money, had not yet emerged among them. There was a ceremonial rhetoric
Chris Wickham
38 See for example J.-C. Maire-Vigueur, Cavaliers et citoyens. Guerre, conflits et société dans
l’Italie communale, XIIe-XIIIe siècles, Paris 2003, pp. 307-335.
39 LP, pp. 301-313, 313-316.
40 For the gifts of the period after the return of the popes to Rome in 1188, see A. Paravicini
Bagliani, La vita quotidiana alla corte dei papi nel Duecento, Bari 1996, pp. 117-133; for annu-
al pensions, Carocci, Il nepotismo cit., pp. 68-70.
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of money of long standing in the city, which facilitated its acceptability as a
political tool. And the non-hereditary nature of the papacy allowed rivalries to
break out at each election, which gave plenty of space for the use of money to
gain political support. These, particularly the first, seem to me to be the rea-
sons why money mattered so insistently in the politics of Rome in the century
1050-1150. There was so much money visibly coming into the city that it is
hardly surprising that lay political actors wanted a cut of it whenever they
could. One could say that money was in Rome, in our period, simply the equiv-
alent of land elsewhere; it looked less “honourable” as a recompense to outside
observers, but that was simply because outside observers did not understand
how Roman politics worked from the inside, and had no interest in knowing it
– partly because they came from regions where such a politics simply seemed
horrible, partly because if there was ever a period in which clerical writers
were in a panic about money it was the age of “papal reform”41.
But money was different from land, as well. If one was given land, on any
terms, as outright property, on lease, or by some form of conditional tenure, it
remained in one’s possession, and could be seen – and, in cases of disloyalty,
could in principle be taken back again. Money was not like this; it was not vis-
ible (handing over money was a much less public act, and therefore potential-
ly could be improper; the fact that it sometimes was said to happen by night is
particularly significant, for night-time acts were often regarded as prima facie
illegal42); it also got spent, and thus both could not easily be given back and had
to be renewed; and it was in our period a politically immediate, rather than a
stable, resource. Hence the fact that money was given, not once, but often; and
not just by one side in a dispute, but potentially by both. It looked all the worse
to outsiders as a result. And it could run out. The lapidary phrase in the
Annales Romani, which appears twice, as we saw, to describe events in 1062
and 1105, that once the money stopped they all went home, sums it up. Land
did not run out for most rulers; money did; and politics could switch over
when that happened. This inevitably meant that the politics of Rome was
never as stable, in our period, as politics elsewhere. For reasons independent
of praise or blame, just because of Rome’s peculiar economic and political
structure, alliances were more fragile, and seemed more cynical to outside
observers. But Hadrian IV was right43, the stomach did have to eat. That was
why no pope had the slightest intention of changing the system of Roman pol-
itics, for all the chorus of complaint; until the territorial politics of Innocent III
and his successors opened the door to a land grab by Roman baronial families
which both dwarfed the greed of the years around 1100 and normalised
Roman political practice in the eyes of the outside world.
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